TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/072991/0729102.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 10.8 KB | 279 lines

                                                                                NATION, Page 17

SCANDALS

Walsh: Targeting A CIA Cover-Up


The independent counsel says the agency's attempt to conceal
its Iran-contra role could have been discovered much sooner

By JAY PETERZELL/WASHINGTON and Lawrence E. Walsh


    Was the illegal diversion of profits from Iranian arms
sales to the Nicaraguan contras an unauthorized plot hatched by
a small band of zealots in Ronald Reagan's National Security
Council? Or did high-ranking members of the U.S. intelligence
community not only learn about the scheme and do nothing to stop
it, but unlawfully help to conceal it from Congress?

    Those unsettling questions have become the focus of the
investigation by Lawrence E. Walsh, who has been the Iran-contra
independent counsel since December 1986. His inquiry is being
assisted by Alan Fiers, former head of the CIA's Central
American Task Force, who has admitted misleading Congress about
when the agency first learned of the diversions. Fiers now says
he became aware of the fund transfers during the summer of 1986
and warned the agency's deputy director of operations, Clair E.
George, about them. But he charges that George ordered him to
deny any knowledge of the U.S. role in supplying weapons to the
contras when he testified before the House intelligence
committee in October 1986.

    Fiers' disclosures may lead Walsh to seek perjury
indictments against George and others. They have also cast a
shadow over President Bush's nomination of Deputy National
Security Adviser Robert M. Gates to become the CIA's director.

    Last week the Senate intelligence committee postponed
Gates' confirmation hearings so that investigators can probe
further his knowledge of the illegal supply effort. Some
Senators find it hard to believe that Gates could not have known
about an operation with which his boss, the late CIA chief
William Casey, and his subordinates were familiar. Gates claimed
repeatedly that he had only vague inklings about the
unauthorized aid in late 1986, when he served as deputy to
Casey. But late last week, in response to new reports that he
was briefed several times on help to the contras, the White
House acknowledged that Gates had played a central role in
overseeing aspects of the plan -- but only the intelligence and
communications parts that Congress had authorized.

    Walsh discussed the case with TIME, including how
disagreements with Attorney General Dick Thornburgh over the use
of classified information hindered his investigation. Excerpts:


    Q. You've had a lot of problems in this prosecution with
classified information. How did that affect your work?

    A. The classified-information problem is frustrating
because there is no review of the subjective judgment of the
intelligence agencies in saying they will not release
information that a court has held necessary for a fair trial.

    It's not just information that the government needs to
prosecute its case. The problem also arises when the defendant
asks for information he says is necessary for a fair trial and
the judge agrees with him. And then the intelligence agency
holds back that information on what sometimes seems to be an
excessive claim of the need for the secrecy of information that
is already publicly known.

    In an ordinary prosecution by the Department of Justice,
the Attorney General can overrule that determination. But the
independent counsel does not have the power to do so. That
decision remains with the Attorney General. Whereas the Attorney
General is fully familiar with prosecutions by his own
department, he is not comparably familiar with a prosecution by
the independent counsel -- and indeed, I think he has less
concern for it.


    Q. Because it's not his prosecution, he's less willing to
bear the pain of declassifying?

    A. That's right. He would be loath to overrule the
intelligence agencies in any event; but in his own case he's at
least in a position to evaluate the importance of the
prosecution.

    In the Joseph Fernandez case I think he grossly
underestimated the value of that case and the strength of that
case. [Fernandez, a former CIA agent, was accused of lying
about his involvement in helping supply arms to the contras. The
charges against him were dismissed in 1989 because Thornburgh
would not release classified documents Fernandez needed to
present his defense.]


    Q. You think that if the Attorney General had understood
the Fernandez case better he would have made the judgment
differently about whether to declassify?

    A. If he were truly concerned about the need for the
prosecution to go forward. It was a key point for this
investigation. Now the Fiers disclosures have in a sense
leapfrogged the Fernandez case. But Mr. Fernandez -- as he
acknowledged in public interviews -- was going to implicate his
superiors. And he named them.


    Q. Whom did he name?

    A. He named Fiers and George.


    Q. You thought the Fernandez case would enable you to
travel up the CIA's chain of command?

    A. Yes, that was the beginning.


    Q. After the Fernandez case washed out, did you think that
Fiers was another likely place to start up that chain of
command?

    A. That was the obvious next starting place. Because Fiers
was the guy to whom Fernandez reported.


    Q. The Fiers plea raises the issue of knowledge by CIA
higher-ups and of a deliberate policy to cover up that
knowledge. Is that accurate?

    A. I don't want to characterize his statements, because
he's obviously going to be a witness. But your interpretation
of the statement, I think, is very fair.


    Q. Is there a conflict in the agency deciding what
information can be released when intelligence officials are
themselves likely targets?

    A. There certainly is the possibility of a conflict of
interest. And without talking about Fiers, I have said
previously that I feel that there is a doctrinaire approach to
classified information and that the protection around it is
excessive.


    Q. So does it create a conflict of interest for the CIA to
be recommending to the Attorney General what information can
and cannot be released?

    A. There is certainly an appearance of conflict of
interest. And there can be a conflict of interest depending upon
how the responsible person at the CIA views the matter. If he's
concerned with protecting the agency or an officer or former
officer of the agency from exposure, that's one thing. If he's
concerned with the protection of information regardless of the
reason for its exposure, that's something else.


    Q. David Boren, the chairman of the Senate intelligence
committee, wants to ask Fiers and George what Gates knew about
Iran-contra. Do you plan to indict George?

    A. I can't talk about our plans that way. But we recognize
the need and desire of the committee to get as much information
as it can. We hope that it can be done without in any way
jeopardizing our investigation. And always the biggest threat
to an investigation or prosecution is a grant of immunity to a
witness. We hope that any immunity would be very sparingly used.


    Q. The Fiers plea has raised the question of whether Gates
knew about illegal support to the contras much earlier than he
says he did and lied to Congress about this. It's hard to
imagine the committee acting on his nomination without resolving
that question. How can they resolve it?

    A. You really have a dilemma here. An inquiry about one
person in isolation is rarely satisfactory or credible. Rather
than investigating the acts of a single individual, you have to
build up a broad context, examining an activity and all its
ramifications. That gives you the background to evaluate each
individual and make a satisfactory decision about whether he's
involved or not.

    It really begins with a massive records search and the
evaluation of the testimony of each witness in light of what has
been learned from the records. And then the evaluation of each
succeeding witness in light of what has been told by others.

    So if the committee wants to know what happened five years
ago, they are confronted with the need to make that kind of
comprehensive investigation themselves, rather than just asking
one or two people. Or they can await the outcome of our
investigation.


    Q. You are building up that sort of complex understanding
of how things worked at the CIA?

    A. Yes. Fiers' disclosures require us to look into a CIA
cover-up.


    Q. I take it Fiers' plea is not really the beginning of
your look at the CIA.

    A. I think you can assume we've been looking into this
since the Fernandez thing.


    Q. Gates was Casey's executive assistant in 1981. Some
people see that as significant; an executive assistant tends to
know everything his boss is doing. And that may be relevant in
evaluating the relationship between Casey and Gates when he was
his deputy.

    A. [Pause.]


    Q. Well, you've said you were surprised by Fiers'
admissions. Why?

    A. By the specificity. Usually when defendants first
decide to assist the prosecution they are more likely to do it
in a generalized way. It doesn't seem to come out as clearly
thought out as Fiers' statements in court were.


    Q. Another conflict is whether Congress should investigate
cases like Iran-contra because there is a need for public
exposure, or wait for a criminal prosecution to bring the facts
to light. How well do criminal prosecutions, even if you're
willing to wait, serve the public-exposure interest in a case
like this?

    A. I think they serve it quite well. New facts do come
out. The criminal process is much slower. It has to be in order
to protect the legitimate interest of each defendant. But the
information does come out in each trial.


    Q. You've certainly gotten some new information from Mr.
Fiers.

    A. I think so.


    Q. Do you feel vindicated, in terms of the usefulness of
the office, by this break? You were in a frustrating situation
for a while.

    A. We were in a frustrating situation. I hesitate to use
the word vindicated. The difficulty of the assignment which the
office drew was obvious. And the difficulties were compounded by
the immunity and classified information problems.

    If additional disclosures come because of the testimony of
any witness, and particularly a cooperating witness who is very
well informed, why I think that adds to the value of the work of
the office.


    Q. How long are you going to operate?

    A. If I finished up tomorrow, I could not say I hurried.
[Laughs.] But obviously, we have to follow up the leads that
come from the Fiers disclosures. We've been trying to wind up.
But that isn't what happened. He's opened an area that has to
be investigated.